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Note
Better the Devil You Know?
UK Alternatives to EU Membership
Tim Peel
As part of the Conservative re-election mandate and in
response to growing unrest from anti-Europe members
(“Euroskeptics”) within his own party, British Prime Minister
David Cameron promised a United Kingdom-wide referendum
on its membership in the European Union (“EU” or “Brussels”).1
This marked the first time since 1975 the British people had
been directly consulted about the UK’s relationship with
Europe,2 and only the third time in the nation’s history the
government had called a national referendum.3 Despite a closely
fought contest,4 on June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom stunned


J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School (2017). The author
would like to thank his wife, Kami, for her patient support as he embarks on a
second career in law.
1. See The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015: Strong Leadership, A
Clear Economic Plan, a Brighter, More Secure Future 30 (2015), https://s3-euwest-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf
[hereinafter Conservative Party Manifesto 2015]; Roger Liddle, The Risk of
Brexit: Britain and Europe in 2015, at 13–14 (2015); Vaughne Miller et al.,
House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper No. 07214, Exiting the EU: UK
Reform Proposals, Legal Impact and Alternatives to Membership 8 (2016);
David Cameron Promises In/Out Referendum on EU, BBC (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21148282.
2. Helen Wallace, The UK: 40 Years of EU Membership, 8 J. CONTEMP.
EUR. RES. 532, 533 (2012).
3. See ELISE UBEROI, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, BRIEFING PAPER NO.
07212, EUROPEAN UNION REFERENDUM BILL 2015–16 8 (2015), http://research
briefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7212/CBP-7212.pdf.
4. See Brexit Poll Tracker, FIN. TIMES, https://ig.ft.com/sites/brexitpolling/ (last visited June 27, 2016) (displaying Brexit poll results from
September 2015 to June 2016); Freddie Sayers, There Has Been a Move Toward
Remain, But It Might Not Be Enough, YOUGOV, https://yougov.co.uk/
news/2016/06/21/there-been-move-toward-remain-it-might-not-be-enou/ (last
visited June 27, 2016) (discussing poll results up until two days before the
referendum vote).
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Europe and most of the western world by voting to leave the
European Union—a decision also known as “Brexit.”5 This Note
seeks to explore two possible treaty arrangements available to
the UK following Brexit. The background section will discuss the
UK’s relationship with the EU, EU exit procedures, and will
introduce alternative treaty options using Switzerland and
Norway as case studies. The analysis section will assess the
viability of each alternative in light of the UK’s current
relationship with the EU and its aims for EU reform. Finally,
this Note concludes that both the Swiss and Norwegian
approaches are inferior to full EU membership.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE UK AND EUROPE
The United Kingdom has a long history with continental
Europe that extends hundreds of years into the past before the
United Kingdom came into being in its current guise.6 In the
context of this lengthy history, erstwhile enemies and
competitors on the continent have only recently become the UK’s
political and economic partners, while previous animosity and
suspicion have not been entirely forgotten. 7 Consequently, the
UK’s relationship with Europe and the EU in particular has
often been politically contentious,8 and is perhaps better
characterized as a marriage of convenience than one of
endearing love and devotion.9 By way of modern example, more
5. See Anushka Asthana et al., UK Votes to Leave EU after Dramatic Night
Divides
Nation,
GUARDIAN
(June
24,
2016,
02:51
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/britain-votes-for-brexit-eureferendum-david-cameron; Steven Erlanger, Britain Votes to Leave E.U.;
Cameron Plans to Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2016), http://www.ny
times.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/britain-brexit-european-unionreferendum.html?_r=1; Brian Wheeler & Alex Hunt, The UK’s EU Referendum:
All You Need to Know, BBC (June 26, 2016), http://www.alghad.com/
articles/974362-The-UKs-EU-referendum-All-you-need-to-know.
6. See generally Union with Ireland Act 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3 c. 67, pmbl.,
art. 1 (U.K.) (demonstrating that the UK did not come into being in its current
format until the accession of Northern Ireland in the early 19th Century).
7. See, e.g., Sam Wilson, Britain and the EU: A Long and Rocky
Relationship, BBC (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics26515129.
8. UBEROI, supra note 3, at 6.
9. See Matthias Matthijs, David Cameron’s Dangerous Game: The Folly of
Flirting with an EU Exit, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 10, 12 (2013) (“The United Kingdom’s
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people in the UK fail to see themselves as citizens of Europe than
all but three of the EU’s twenty-eight member states.10 One
academic suggests that Europe has always been a problem for
Britain in a way that it has not for any other member state in
the EU, striking at such pronounced British nerves as a strong
national identity and a proud colonial history.11
A conflicted approach to the EU has been evident from the
very beginning of the European project, as the UK initially opted
out of joining the European Community (an earlier iteration of
the EU), only to change course entirely and apply to join several
years later.12 However, the UK struggled to convince its
European counterparts that it was a worthy, or rather,
appropriate member of the European club and did not achieve
accession to the European Community until approximately 10
years later, in 1973.13 Further flip-flopping followed when the
UK held a referendum a mere two years after its accession in
which 67% of voters cast their ballots in favor of sticking with
Europe rather than abandoning the European Community
altogether.14
In more recent times, despite recognizing the value of the
free movement of goods and services known as the Single
Market—possibly the UK’s chief purpose for EU
membership15—the UK’s resistance to Europe continued with
rejection of key policies such as the single currency,16 the

relationship with Europe has never been warm, much less passionate; it is more
like a loveless marriage [based] on cost-benefit analysis rather than rhetoric
about a common European destiny . . . .”) (alteration in original).
10. See EUR. COMM’N, STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 82 PUBLIC OPINION IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, FIRST RESULTS 27 (Dec. 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_first_en.pdf (indicating that 49% of those
surveyed in the UK do not feel like citizens of the European Union).
11. See Vernon Bogdanor, Professor Emeritus, Gresham College, Lecture
on Britain and the Continent at Greshman C. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.
gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/britain-and-the-continent.
12. Wallace, supra note 2, at 532.
13. See Wilson, supra note 7 (noting that the UK’s application to the EEC,
a precursor to the EU, was vetoed twice by then French President Charles de
Gaulle).
14. See UBEROI, supra note 3, at 6.
15. David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, EU Speech at
Bloomberg (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/euspeech-at-bloomberg.
16. See Iain Begg, Could It Be ‘Brexpulsion’ Rather than ‘Brexit’?, 18 EUR.
POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 4 (2015).
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Schengen agreement,17 the EU fiscal treaty,18 and joint police
and criminal justice measures.19 In a further demonstration of
its desire to keep the EU at arm’s length, Britain enacted the
European Union Act, which required a national referendum to
approve any further concession of power to the EU or
amendment to existing EU treaties.20 The UK has strongly
opposed surrender of sovereignty to Brussels21 and rejected
outright the European ideal of an “ever closer union.”22
The Eurozone crisis in 2011 and 2012, coupled with
Brussels’ failure to take decisive steps to address the struggling
economies of several member states, added to lingering
discontent with the UK’s EU membership and breathed new
wind into the sails of Euroskeptics within the Conservative
Party.23 Calls for a straight in/out referendum grew louder,
evidenced by a number of Private Members’ Bills to that end.24
In 2013, David Cameron finally relented by announcing that a
national referendum would be held on Britain’s continued
membership in the EU25 and later renewed that promise in the
2015 Conservative Party Manifesto.26 Following his successful
reelection, Cameron originally committed to hold a referendum
before the end of 2017,27 but brought the date forward to June
17. See id.; CONSERVATIVE PARTY EUROPEAN ELECTION MANIFESTO 2014,
at 34 (2014), https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20
Files/MANIFESTO%202014/Large%20Print%20Euro%20Manifesto_English.a
shx (stating that the Conservatives have kept Britain out of the Schengen open
borders area).
18. See Bruno Waterfield, EU Suffers Worst Split in History as David
Cameron
Blocks
Treaty
Change
TELEGRAPH,
(Dec.
9,
2011),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ey/8945155/EU-suffersworst-split-in-history-as-David-Cameron-blocks-treaty-change.html.
19. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
20. European Union Act 2011, c. 12 (U.K.).
21. See Philip Hammond, Britain’s Four-Point Package for EU Reform,
POLITICO (June 10, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.politico.eu/article/britainsfour-point-package-for-eu-reform (noting that Britain’s EU membership has
resulted in a loss of sovereignty causing public support for continued EU
membership to be wafer thin).
22. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 1, Oct.
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1; Cameron, supra note 15, at 6 (“We understand
and respect the right of others to maintain their commitment to this goal [of an
ever closer union]. But for Britain - and perhaps for others - it is not the
objective.”) (alteration in original).
23. See LIDDLE, supra note 1, at 11–14.
24. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 8; UBEROI, supra note 3, at 31–32.
25. See Cameron, supra note 15.
26. CONSERVATIVE PARTY MANIFESTO 2015, supra note 1, at 30.
27. Id.
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23, 2016 on the back of “successful” negotiations with EU leaders
concerning the UK’s EU membership.28
B. THE UK’S RENEGOTIATED EU MEMBERSHIP
In anticipation of the referendum, Cameron met with
European leaders early in 2016 to renegotiate Britain’s EU
membership and attempt to secure concessions in several policy
areas.29 Cameron alluded to the main areas of focus for
renegotiation in a number of earlier speeches and articles,30 and
fleshed out the key points in a letter to the president of the
European Council.31 UK demands included: rejection of an evercloser union (which contemplates restoration of parliamentary
sovereignty), a curb on immigration into the UK from within the
EU (including a freeze on social benefits to migrants), policies to
ensure that non-Euro countries are not penalized for
maintaining a different currency, and targets to reduce the
burden of excessive EU legislation.32 The EU proved remarkably
receptive and substantial agreement was achieved on many of
the key policy areas.33 Having secured what he believed to be a
28. See EU Referendum: Cameron Sets June Date for UK Vote, BBC (Feb.
20, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35621079.
29.
See Jan Strupczewski & Elizabeth Piper, Cameron Hails EU Deal to Give Brit
ain ’Special Status’, Battle Looms, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2016, 3:25 AM), http://w
ww.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-idUSKCN0VS153; see also Cameron,
supra note 15, at 6 (“It is wrong to ask the people whether to stay or go before
we have had a chance to put the relationship right.”); Q&A: What Britain Wants
from Europe, BBC (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics32695399.
30. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 15; David Cameron, David Cameron: The
EU Is Not Working and We Will Change It, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 15, 2014, 9:00
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/10700644/
David-Cameron-the-EU-is-not-working-and-we-will-change-it.html; see also
Mark Leftly, EU Referendum: What are David Cameron’s Demands in the EU
Talks?, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
politics/eu-referendum-what-are-david-cameron-s-demands-in-the-eu-talksa6725741.html (discussing the main points of negotiation Cameron planned to
address with the EU).
31. Letter from David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom,
to Donald Tusk, President, European Council (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.gov/
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_
Tusk_letter.pdf [hereinafter Cameron Letter].
32. See id.
33. See Jennifer Rankin, David Cameron’s EU Deal: What He Wanted and
What He Got, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2016, 5:17 PM), http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2016/feb/19/camerons-eu-deal-what-he-wanted-and-what-he-got.
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special status for Britain as a result of the renegotiation,34
Cameron campaigned for the UK to remain in the EU.35
Although the reaction to Cameron’s EU deal was mixed in some
quarters36 and skeptical in others,37 Britain’s later vote to leave
the EU effectively rendered the renegotiation meaningless.
C. WITHDRAWAL REQUIREMENTS
While the British people voted to leave the EU several
months ago, in order to make its departure officially binding and
for the withdrawal process to commence, Britain needed to
trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union
(“TEU”).38 While Article 50 governs withdrawal of a member
state, it provides relatively sparse detail on the process.39 To
withdraw, a member state must notify the European Council of
its intention and negotiate an agreement covering the
arrangements for withdrawal and its future relationship with
the EU.40 The decision to leave does not require the formal
agreement of other member states41 and there are no explicit
conditions for withdrawal.42 Although the decision to withdraw
from the EU does not require the agreement of other member
34. Strupczewski & Piper, supra note 29.
35. See Ivana Kottasova, UK Leader: Why Europe Is Good for Britain,
CNNMONEY
(Mar.
10,
2016,
11:41
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/
2016/03/10/news/eu-uk-referendum-david-cameron/index.html;
Heather
Stewart et al., David Cameron Makes Final Plea for Britain to Remain in the
EU, GUARDIAN (June 22, 2016, 2:46 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2016/jun/22/david-cameron-makes-final-plea-for-britain-to-vote-to-remain-inthe-eu; EU Referendum: Cameron Sets June Date for UK Vote, supra note 28;
Q&A: What Britain Wants from Europe, supra note 29.
36. See Cameron’s EU Deal: The Reaction at Home and Abroad, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 20, 2016, 3:18 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/20/
cameron-eu-deal-reaction-politicians-journalists.
37. See, e.g., Jon Stone, Tory MPs Brand David Cameron’s EU Deal ‘Thin
Gruel,’ ‘Watered Down’ and Full of Broken Promises, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 3,
2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-insistseu-deal-is-the-strongest-package-ever-but-his-own-mps-arent-impresseda6850941.html.
38. See Jennifer Rankin et al., What Is Article 50 and Why Is it So Central
to the Brexit Debate?, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2016, 7:32 AM), http://www.the
guardian.com/politics/2016/jun/25/article-50-brexit-debate-britain-eu.
39. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, supra note
22, art. 50.
40. See id..
41. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 28.
42. See KLAUS DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF EUROPEAN LAW 18
(2010), http://europa.eu/documentation/legislation/pdf/oa8107147_en.pdf.
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states, international legal norms dictate that EU member states
must consent to any withdrawal agreement.43 If no agreement is
reached as to the manner in which the withdrawal will take
place, withdrawal automatically becomes effective two years
after notification of the intention to withdraw, unless the parties
agree to an extension.44 No withdrawal agreement has been
concluded under current EU treaty provisions.45 However, EU
trade agreements with other nations have typically required
longer than three years and frequently longer than five years to
conclude.46
Until withdrawal becomes effective, the withdrawing
member state retains all the privileges of EU membership,
except that it cannot participate in discussions about, nor vote
upon the terms of any withdrawal agreement in the European
Council.47 The absence of a UK vote on a withdrawal agreement
may affect the voting balance of member states and, one report
contends, grant the France-led protectionist bloc a significant
majority sway.48 The EU would negotiate any agreement
through the European Council, following a mandate from EU
ministers acting by a qualified majority after obtaining consent

43. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 28 (“There is no mention in Article
50 TEU of ratification of the withdrawal agreement by Member States, but this
would be necessary under international legal norms.”). But see STEPHEN BOOTH
ET AL., OPEN EUROPE, WHAT IF . . . ? THE CONSEQUENCES, CHALLENGES &
OPPORTUNITIES FACING BRITAIN OUTSIDE EU 14–15 (2015), http://2ihmoy1d3v
7630ar9h2rsglp.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/150507
-Open-Europe-What-If-Report-Final-Digital-Copy.pdf (noting that the approval
of member states need not be unanimous, unless it cuts across policy areas
within the preserve of member states, such as investment protection or
elements of transport).
44. See BORCHARDT, supra note 42.
45. See HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, RESEARCH PAPER 13/42,
LEAVING THE EU 5 (2013),
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/
documents/RP13-42/RP13-42.pdf (quoting the President of the European
Council who stated that a UK exit “would be legally and politically a most
complicated and unpractical affair”); BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 14.
46. See BOOTH ET AL, supra note 43, at 15–16 (noting that an agreement
with Canada commenced in 2009 and has yet to be concluded, while it took
Switzerland approximately 10 years to conclude its bilateral arrangement with
the EU).
47. See FLEXCIT: A PLAN FOR LEAVING THE EUROPEAN UNION 38 (July
2016),
http://www.eureferendum.com/documents/flexcit.pdf
[hereinafter
FLEXIT]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, supra note 22,
art. 50 § 4; BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 14.
48. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 15.
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from the European Parliament, the latter of which has veto
power over the entire withdrawal agreement.49
D. WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES?
The non-exhaustive table below demonstrates a variety of
different treaty arrangements and trade agreements the EU has
entered with countries throughout the world:
Country

EU Treaty Arrangement

Norway,
Lichtenstein,
Iceland

Agreement on European Economic Area (“EEA”) &
European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”)
membership

Switzerland

Bi-lateral trade agreements & EFTA membership

Turkey

Customs Union Agreement

Australia

EU-Partnership Framework

United States

Bi-lateral trade agreements; work on
comprehensive agreement (Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership).

Argentina

Mercosur Agreement

South Africa

Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement

Canada

Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement

Source: European Commission50
While the UK could feasibly have attempted to model its
future relationship with the EU after any of the above treaty
arrangements, Switzerland and Norway provide two
particularly interesting case studies because each is an
immediate European neighbor and significant trade partner, but
has deliberately refused full EU membership.
49. See id. at 14; HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, supra note 45, at 10.
50. Aggregated from a number of individual country pages. See Countries
and Regions, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-andregions/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
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1. The Swiss Approach
Despite the importance of EU trade to its economy,51 in 1992
Switzerland rejected membership in the EEA, which would have
granted unrestricted access to the Single Market and provided a
basis for commencing negotiations for full EU membership.52
Instead, rather than formalizing its relationship with the EU
through a single comprehensive treaty arrangement or through
its membership in the European Free Trade Association,
Switzerland negotiated a series of bilateral agreements that
cover specific economic and social sectors.53 The most important
of these agreements are known as Bilaterals I and II,54 which
cover areas such as trade, aviation, research, transport,
agriculture and the environment.55
Switzerland does not have full access to the Single Market
and no current agreement that covers services specifically,
including financial services.56 Furthermore, the EU conditioned
the bilateral approach upon Switzerland’s acceptance of the free
movement of persons57 and inserted a “guillotine clause,”
whereby, if any of the separate elements is breached, the
remaining elements of the bilateral agreement cease to apply
after a period of six months without resolution.58
51. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF.,
SWITZERLAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 21 (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.eda.
admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/EuropaeischeAngelegenheiten/S
chweiz-und-EU_en.pdf (noting that the EU is Switzerland’s most important
trading partner).
52. See id.
53. See Switzerland, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/switzerland (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); see
generally List of Treaties by Country: Switzerland, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/
world/agreements/searchByCountryAndContinent.do?countryId=3820&countr
yName=Switzerland (last visited Nov. 14, 2015).
54. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51, at 24–25.
55. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., THE MAJOR BILATERAL
AGREEMENTS SWITZERLAND EU 7, 17 (2016), https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/
dea/en/documents/folien/Folien-Abkommen_en.pdf.
56. See CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUST., DOING THINGS BY HALVES?
ALTERNATIVES TO UK EU MEMBERSHIP: LESSONS FROM SWITZERLAND AND
NORWAY 11 (2013), http://www.cbi.org.uk/media/2133649/doing_things_by_
halves_- lessons_from_switzerland_and_norway_cbi_report_july_2013.pdf. But
see BUS. FOR BRITAIN, CHANGE OR GO: HOW BRITAIN WOULD GAIN INFLUENCE
AND PROSPER OUTSIDE AN UNREFORMED EU 240 (2015), http://forbritain.org/
cogwholebook.pdf (claiming that, even in the EU, the Single Market is
underdeveloped for services).
57. FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51.
58. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51, at 26 (noting that the
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Switzerland is required to make economic contributions to a
variety of social cohesion programs, in addition to the programs
in which it participates directly.59 Recent estimates indicate that
Switzerland contributes approximately £420 million (or
approximately $520 million as of November 2016) annually,
which is lower than the UK’s net contributions to the EU on
either an aggregate or per capita basis.60
Few give serious credence to the Swiss approach as a viable
alternative treaty arrangement for the UK.61 The principal
challenges with this approach include EU dissatisfaction with
the bilateral model, the static nature of bilateral agreements,
and serious uncertainty over the nature of an agreement the UK
could secure for itself under this model.62 By contrast, other
commentators find virtue in the bilateral model, noting that it
retains some access to the Single Market,63 at least partial
sovereignty,64 and flexibility to pursue trade agreements with
third countries.65
2. The Norwegian Approach
Norway maintains a close relationship with the EU despite
rejecting full membership in two separate national referenda.66
guillotine clause applies to Bilaterals I, which contain the agreement on the free
movement of persons).
59. See, e.g., ARABELLA THORP, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, STANDARD
NOTE SN06090, SWITZERLAND’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU 6 (2011),
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06090/SN06090.pdf ;
MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 40–43; BOOTH EL AL., supra note 43, at 57.
60. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 43.
61. See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 41; BREXIT, supra note 47, at
48–50; BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 57–61.
62. See FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 48–50; CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH
INDUSTRY, supra note 56, at 13. But see IAIN MANSFIELD, A BLUEPRINT FOR
BRITAIN: OPENNESS NOT ISOLATION 9 (2014), http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/
default/files/publications/files/Brexit%20Entry%20170_final_bio_web.pdf
(suggesting that the best alternative to EU membership for the UK lies
“somewhere between that of Turkey’s and Switzerland’s: [sic] membership of
EFTA . . . .”); BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56 (stating that many of the
criticisms of the Swiss model do not stand up to scrutiny).
63. See CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY, supra note 56, at 10;
THORP, supra note 59, at 3.
64. See, THORP, supra note 59, at 5 (noting that none of Switzerland’s
agreements with the EU transfers any legal or decision making authority to a
supranational body).
65. See BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56, at 239.
66. ARABELLA LANG,
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Like Switzerland, Norway is a member of the EFTA, which aims
to promote free trade between its members (consisting of
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein) and the EU.67
EFTA membership is not required to enter trade agreements
with the EU, but is a prerequisite to joining the EEA.68 Norway’s
additional membership in the EEA permits full access to the
Single Market.69
In return for access to the Single Market, the EU, through
the EEA agreement, requires Norway to adopt a significant
portion of the acquis communitaire (“acquis”), the accumulated
body of European law, including the free movement of persons,
capital, goods and services, known as the “four freedoms.”70 EEA
membership also requires adoption of “flanking” policies in areas
horizontal to the four freedoms, such as labor law, consumer
protection, and environmental policy,71 but excludes common
policies in the areas of agriculture, fisheries, trade (with third
countries), security, and the establishment of a customs union.72
The absence of full integration in these latter areas allows
Norway some discretion to set its own policies and to enter into
trade agreements with other countries without the EU’s consent
or involvement.73 All in all, it is estimated that Norway has
adopted approximately three-fourths of the EU’s acquis as a
direct result of EEA membership,74 in addition to having

HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, STANDARD NOTE 6522, NORWAY’S RELATIONSH
IP WITH THE
EU 2 (2013),
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/
documents/SN06522/SN06522.pdf.
67. See generally The European Free Trade Association, EFTA, http://www.efta.
int/about-efta/european-free-trade-association (last visited Nov. 14, 2015)
(providing background information on the European Free Trade Association).
68. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 84 (noting that there is no necessity for the
UK to join the EFTA in order to negotiate bilateral agreements with the EU);
BOOTH EL AL., supra note 43, at 56 (noting that accession to the EEA must be
preceded by joining the EFTA).
69. See generally The Basic Features of the EEA Agreement, EFTA,
http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement/eea-basic-features (last visited Nov. 14,
2015) (describing the role of the European Economic Area); Countries and
Regions:
Norway, EUROPEAN
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/countries/norway (last visited Nov 14, 2015) (explaining
Norway’s trade situation policies and statistics).
70. Id.; see also Agreement on the European Economic Area, Jan. 3, 1994,
1994 O.J. (L 1) 1 (stating the four freedoms).
71. FOREIGN AFF. COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: UK
GOVERNMENT POLICY, 2013–14, HC 87-II, at 52 (UK).
72. Id.
73. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 56.
74. LANG, supra note 66.
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concluded a further 74 voluntary agreements with the EU
outside the EEA framework.75
In contrast with the Swiss bilateral arrangement, the EEA
agreement is dynamic in the sense that new policies are
automatically integrated into an open-ended annex to the
agreement.76 Despite this, EEA countries can exercise a right of
reservation, or veto, which, at least in theory, permits outright
rejection of any specific piece of EU legislation an EEA member
deems objectionable.77 However, EEA members are expected to
make “every effort to find a mutually acceptable solution where
a serious problem arises in any area.”78 Norway has no official
say in the development or implementation of EU policy,79 but is
permitted to give input at various junctures,80 and makes a
concerted effort to exert its influence in the early stages of policy
development through lobbying.81
Like Switzerland, Norway is required to make monetary
contributions to a variety of EU social programs and is the single
largest contributor among EEA member countries.82 Norway’s
annual contributions in 2013 were estimated at approximately
€600 million (or $650 million), making it the tenth largest
contributor to EU programs despite lacking full-fledged EU
member status. Norway’s contributions represent a little over
half of the UK’s per capita contributions as an EU member.83
Experts generally favor Norway’s EFTA/EEA treaty
arrangement over Switzerland’s bilateral approach. 84 Those
75. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 7.
76. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 6.
77. Id. at 7.
78. Agreement on the European Economic Area, supra note 70, at 102.
79. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 8.
80. Id.; see also NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., NORWAY AND THE
EU – PARTNERS FOR EUROPE 16–17 (2011),
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/UD/Vedlegg/eu/norge_og_eu_2
011.pdf (noting EU invitations to participate in several EU bodies).
81. See JONATHAN LINDSELL, CIVITAS: INST. FOR THE STUDY OF CIVIL
SOC’Y, THE NORWEGIAN WAY: A CASE STUDY FOR BRITAIN’S FUTURE
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU 40 (2015), http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/
TheNorwegianWay (stating that, while it is true that Norway has no voice or
representation on every EU committee, “[i]t has plenty of input.”).
82. See NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 80, at 18
(reporting that Norway contributed approximately €1.79 billion between 20092014 to reduce social and economic disparities within the EEA).
83. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 7.
84. Compare FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71, at 54 (noting that the
EEA Agreement is often considered a second best solution to both closer or
looser ties with the EU), and CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note
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who are supportive of the Norwegian approach point to
undiminished access to the Single Market,85 reduced monetary
contributions to the EU86 and a stronger voice on the
international stage.87 Conversely, critics suggest that EU red
tape would remain with EEA membership,88 while the UK would
also lose its power to shape and influence policy,89 a phenomenon
sometimes referred to as a “democratic deficit.”90 In addition,
some question whether the UK’s size, profile, and objectives are
sufficiently similar to other EFTA/EEA countries to warrant
joining their ranks.91
II. ANALYSIS
A. WITHDRAWAL
Whatever alternative EU arrangement the UK considers, it
will first need to begin with withdrawal from the EU. While the
EU recognizes Article 50 of the TEU as the official means for
withdrawal, no member state has ever gone through this
process. Consequently, because the withdrawal process and its
outcome are conjectural, several commentators have suggested
that the UK should negotiate an exit outside the EU treaties.92
This could be accomplished by relying upon the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), a
United Nations agreement that, inter alia, provides guidance for
the abrogation of treaties between states.93 Some commentators
contend that the Vienna Convention would allow the UK to
56, at 9 (concluding that the Norwegian model would not work for the UK), with
NORTH, supra note 47, at 55 (“The UK will have to adopt an ‘off-the-shelf’ option
and the best one on offer is the EEA agreement.”), and LINDSELL, supra note
81, at 83 (“The Norwegian approach to the European Union offers a genuine
alternative to consider.”).
85. See, e.g., BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56, at 233.
86. See, e.g., CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 7.
87. See, e.g., LINDSELL, supra note 81, at 27, 30.
88. See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 39.
89. See, e.g., JOHN
SPRINGFORD
ET
AL.,
CTR. FOR EUROPEAN REFORM, THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF LEAVING
THE
EU 32 (2014), http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/
attachments/pdf/2014/report_smc_final_report_june2014-9013.pdf.
90. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 67 (explaining that the democratic
deficit is a major drawback to the EEA/EFTA arrangement).
91. See, e.g., FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71, at 54–55.
92. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 38.
93. Id.
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bypass formal negotiations contemplated in TEU Article 50 and
provide a stronger platform for the UK to dictate the course of
proceedings.94 However, the legal principle of lex specialis
derogat legi generali is likely to apply, whereby greater weight
is given to the more specific of two or more treaty provisions that
touch upon the same subject matter.95 In addition, any attempt
to negotiate outside the framework set forth in the EU treaties
would likely aggravate European powers and damage the UK’s
chances of maintaining positive future relations with the EU.96
Consequently, despite the attendant uncertainty, it is likely that
the UK will have to negotiate through the Article 50 framework.
B. THE SWISS BILATERAL MODEL
Switzerland’s bilateral approach comports with a classic
form of government cooperation,97 but is somewhat unique in
that it comprises a collection of individual agreements, rather
than a single treaty covering a broad swathe of policy areas.98
Although some authors assert the contrary, Switzerland’s
membership in the EFTA is not a prerequisite to the bilateral
approach and did not significantly influence the structure of its
treaty arrangement with the EU.99 Consequently, the UK would
not need to join the EFTA in order to negotiate a comparable
bilateral model.100 However, while the bilateral approach is
available as a theoretical alternative treaty arrangement, it has
some significant practical limitations.
1. Sovereignty
On its face, the bilateral approach appears to have
preserved sovereignty in certain policy areas and the freedom to
reject some EU proposals outright. In some respects, then, the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See BOOTH EL AL., supra note 43, at 16 (stating that unilateral
withdrawal through the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties should not
be used “[u]nless the UK is truly prepared to ‘go it alone’”) (alteration in
original).
97. See CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 10.
98. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51, at 43 (indicating that
Switzerland has concluded 120 agreements with the EU).
99. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 59.
100. Id. (noting that EFTA membership is not required to pursue the “Swiss
option”).
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bilateral approach appears to have given Switzerland the ability
to determine the areas in which it wants to cooperate with
Europe and those where the national interest is such that it
wishes to remain autonomous.101 The structure of the bilateral
approach not only preserves Swiss sovereignty for policy areas
outside the bilateral agreements, but also extends to policy areas
falling squarely within the bilaterals by avoiding transfer of any
legal or decision-making authority to the EU as a supranational
body.102 This contrasts with the experience of EU member states
whose domestic laws and even national constitutions are
expected to yield in the event of conflict with EU legislation or
directives.103 In addition, each party to the bilateral agreements
is responsible for implementation of the terms in its own
territory.104 Hence, at least on paper, the degree of sovereignty
Switzerland has been able to retain appears impressive and
would appeal to the UK, given its sense that it has conceded too
much power to Brussels as a consequence of EU membership.105
However, Swiss sovereignty is more illusory than real. In
practice, Switzerland must adopt a wide range of EU rules and
policies on a voluntary basis in order, for example, for its
businesses to have continued access to the EU import market.106
Indeed, one author estimates that approximately 40% of Swiss
legislation is derived from the EU,107 a striking estimate
considering that Switzerland has specifically opted out of
cumbersome EU policies, such as the Common Agricultural
Policy (“CAP”) and Common Fisheries Policy (“CFP”).108 As
another author notes, “[i]f support for the Swiss model in the UK
is motivated by a desire to escape EU regulation, then the former
is certainly not the way to pursue that objective.”109 Crucially,
the Swiss model requires adoption of EU rules and regulation,
voluntarily or otherwise, without any say or influence over their

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See John Henry Dingfelder Stone, Agreeing to Disagree: The Primacy
Debate Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European
Court of Justice, 25 MINN. J. INT’L L. 127, 129 (2016).
104. THORP, supra note 59, at 5.
105. See Cameron, supra note 30 (noting that powers should not always flow
to Brussels).
106. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 12.
107. NORTH, supra note 47, at 48.
108. See THORP, supra note 59, at 2.
109. FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71, at 73.

626

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2

development.110 The irony here is that “an arrangement meant
to protect Switzerland’s autonomy is actually eroding it.”111
Further, when Switzerland has attempted to fully assert its
supposed sovereignty by rejecting a particular policy, the EU has
reacted strongly with the threat of sanctions and a full review of
its treaty obligations.112
2. Free Movement of Persons
The EU specifically conditioned the bilateral approach upon
acceptance of the free movement of persons,113 which is likely to
remain a condition were the UK to pursue a similar treaty
arrangement. Data from 2013 indicate that approximately 23%
of Switzerland’s population is foreign versus only 13% of the
population of England and Wales, leading one author to conclude
that the bilateral approach offers no particular advantage with
respect to immigration.114 Although Switzerland accepted the
free movement of persons as a central element of its treaty
arrangement with the EU when the Bilaterals originally became
effective, it has since become a contentious issue domestically.115
Matters came to a head in 2014 when Swiss voters approved an
initiative to restrict the free movement of persons in derogation
of Bilaterals I:116 an initiative similar in intent to the UK’s
proposal to restrict immigration from within the EU.117 In
response, the EU threatened to reduce Switzerland’s access to
EU institutions and the Single Market, and cancel Bilaterals
I.118 Although the EU has yet to carry out the more serious
110. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 39.
111. FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71, at 72.
112. See UE Warns Switzerland All Treaties Will Be Reviewed After Anti
Immigration Vote, EURONEWS (Sep. 2, 2014), http://www.euronews.com/2014/
02/09/eu-warns-switzerland-all-treaties-will-be-reviewed-after-antiimmigration-vote.
113. FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51, at 21.
114. See FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 62.
115. See FED. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFF., supra note 51, at 29–30 (explaining
that the Swiss government introduced tighter immigration measures following
the accession of 10 EU member states in 2004 and Swiss voters approved an
initiative against mass immigration in 2014).
116. See id.
117. See Cameron Letter, supra note 31.
118. See, e.g., EU Warns Switzerland All Treaties Will Be Reviewed After
Anti-Immigration Vote, supra note 112; Nicola Forster & Ivo Nicholas Scherrer,
Switzerland and the EU: The Heavy Cost of Isolation, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar.
20, 2014, 6:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/student-reporter/
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elements of these threats, its reaction suggests limited scope for
Britain to seriously negotiate the free movement of persons to its
advantage and virtually precludes its outright prohibition.
3. The Single Market
Switzerland’s access to the Single Market appears adequate
on its face, but the absence of a provision covering services,
specifically financial services, will be of particular concern to the
UK.119 Because the UK’s economy is heavily servicesdependent120 and houses the EU’s largest and most important
financial center,121 access to the Single Market would need to
include services to have any real value to the UK.122 In an
attempt to secure broader market access than Switzerland, the
UK could invoke its trade deficit with the EU123 or relative
economic power as the fifth largest economy in the world.124
However, despite any gains in leverage this might bring over
Switzerland’s position, the EU remains a more important
market for the UK than does the UK to the EU.125 Consequently,
there is no guarantee that the bilateral model would provide the
kind of market access the UK requires. In any event, consistent
with the Swiss experience, the EU is likely to require
concessions in the form of EU regulation and monetary
contributions as a prerequisite to access to the Single Market.
switzerland-and-the-eu-th_b_5003363.html. See also Jon Henley, Whatever You
Do, Don’t Become Switzerland, Academics Tell UK, GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/nov/11/whatever-you-do-dontbecome-switzerland-swiss-academics-tell-uk (explaining that funding for
academic research has experienced severe cuts following the Swiss vote on EU
immigration quotas).
119. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 12.
120. Id. at 4.
121. See LONG FIN., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTRES INDEX 15, at 5 tbl.1
(2014),
http://www.longfinance.net/images/GFCI15_15March2014.pdf;
SPRINGFORD ET AL., supra note 89, at 49.
122. See SPRINGFORD ET AL., supra note 89 (noting that services account for
an unusually high proportion of UK exports).
123. Id. at 28.
124. See, e.g., News Release, Ctr. for Econ. & Bus. Research, World Economic
League Table 2016 Highlights, 4 tbl.1 (Dec 26, 2015), http://www.cebr.com/welt2.
125. Compare MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 11, with Jonathan Porter,
After Brexit: How Important Would UK Trade Be to the EU?, NAT. INST. ECON.
& SOC. RESEARCH (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/after-brexithow-important-would-uk-trade-be-eu. But see MANSFIELD, supra note 62, at 14
fig.1 (demonstrating that UK trade with the EU has declined over time).
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Indeed, for the type of broad access the UK would prefer, the EU
may require more extensive concessions, similar to those it
currently requires of EEA member countries.
4. EU Bilateral Aversion
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the bilateral approach is a
strong EU aversion to this type of treaty arrangement.126 For
example, in 2012, the European Council reported that “the
approach taken by Switzerland to participate in EU policies and
programmes through sectoral agreements in more and more
areas in the absence of any horizontal institutional framework,
has reached its limits and needs to be reconsidered.”127 The
Council added: “[A]ny further extension of this system would in
addition bear the risk of undermining the EU’s relations with
the EEA EFTA partners.”128 One author suggests that part of
the problem with the bilateral approach is that it is not a
“conscious, studied arrangement, but a series of ad hoc
responses” to Swiss rejection of full EU membership.129 Whether
or not this observation is entirely accurate, one can reasonably
conclude that the bilateral model is an aberration, and the EU
has little stomach to see another treaty develop along similar
lines.130 Hence, given EU aversion to the bilateral approach in
general and a stated dislike for policy “cherry picking”
characteristic of the approach in particular,131 any attempt by
the UK to negotiate a series of bilateral agreements is likely to
prove futile.
C. BILATERAL SUMMARY
The Swiss option does not represent a significant
improvement over the UK’s current arrangement with the EU,
126. See Council of the European Union “I/A” Item Note 17151/12, Draft
Council Conclusions on EU Relations with EFTA Countries ¶ 31 (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-17151-2012-INIT/en/pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 48.
130. Id. (noting that the Swiss model is seen as an exception, rather than a
formal model).
131. Id. at 39 (quoting Criticism from Berlin: Merkel Sees “Significant
Problems” Arising from the Swiss Vote, DER SPIEGEL (Feb. 10, 2014, 1:00 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/merkel-sieht-probleme-nach-schweizervotum-zur-zuwanderung-a-a952533.html).
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and is in some ways inferior. For example, the bilateral
agreements have not adequately curtailed immigration, given
an estimated four-fold net EU immigration increase as compared
with the UK.132 Likewise, while Switzerland has experienced
some reduction in the imposition of EU regulation, it is still
obligated to adopt a significant portion of EU rules with limited
say in their development. Even the apparent bright spot of Swiss
sovereignty is of little practical use if, when exercised, it
threatens the existence of other elements of the treaty
arrangement.
D. THE NORWEGIAN (EEA) MODEL
EEA membership largely dictates Norway’s treaty
arrangement and relationship with the EU. Rather than an
alternative path to EU membership, some see the EEA as a
stepping-stone to prepare countries for full accession to the
EU.133 Iceland provides some support for this theory, having
formally applied for EU membership in 2009, although it has
since withdrawn from negotiations.134 As an initial matter, given
the UK’s vote to withdraw from the EU, it is unlikely to be
enthusiastic about a treaty arrangement that echoes the very
sentiment of the “ever closer union”135 it sought to escape. Other
elements of the EEA approach offer some advantages over the
bilateral model, but ultimately fail to adequately satisfy UK
objectives.136
1. The Single Market
As a member of the EEA, Norway’s access to the Single
Market is more substantial than Switzerland’s. Indeed,
Norway’s access to the Single Market is no greater (or worse)
than the UK’s current access as a full-fledged EU member state,
but, like Switzerland, has the advantage of exclusion from CAP,
132. BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 59.
133. FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71.
134. European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations:
Iceland, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-countryinformation/iceland/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
135. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, supra note
22.
136. See generally Cameron Letter, supra note 31 (laying out UK reform
objectives); Rankin, supra note 33 (reviewing Cameron’s reform objectives).
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CFP and some other policy areas.137 Aside from offering superior
domestic control over policy areas outside the EEA Agreement,
perhaps the greatest strength of the EEA approach is that it
comprises an “off-the-shelf” solution .138 This type of solution
would allow the UK to remain in the Single Market with
virtually all of the privileges it currently enjoys.139 Moreover,
because the UK already has the technical measures in place as
a fully-fledged member of the EU, an off-the-shelf approach
would allow it to seamlessly adopt most, if not all, of the EEA
Agreement in a relatively short space of time.140 In contrast, the
Swiss approach would involve time-consuming and human
capital-intensive negotiation of a series of individual agreements
that may impose unique technical demands.141
2. Democratic Deficit
Superior market access, however, comes at a price in the
form of substantial adoption of the acquis, including the four
freedoms,142 together with additional rules the EU periodically
adds to the annex of the EEA Agreement.143 In one respect, the
UK would be no worse off by following the Norwegian approach
because, in most instances, the EU already requires acceptance
of rules and legislation as a signatory to EU treaties. However,
like the bilateral model, as a member of the EEA, the UK would
no longer have the ability to influence or veto legislation (the
democratic deficit).144 Whether this represents a significant
disadvantage when compared with the status quo is a matter of
debate. For example, one report suggests that a democratic
deficit is also present in the EU,145 while another questions the
value of the UK’s existing veto power and its ability to influence
legislation even with full EU member status.146 While it is true
137. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 60.
138. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 55.
139. BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 50.
140. See FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 55.
141. See BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56, at 241.
142. Id. at 236.
143. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 6.
144. See FOREIGN AFF. COMM., supra note 71.
145. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 21 (noting that the only way to mitigate
the democratic deficit among EU member states is to reinforce the role of
national parliaments).
146. See LINDSELL, supra note 81, at 27 (explaining that Britain attempted
to use its veto power in 2011 to no effect).
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that EEA members have a veto right for unreasonable EU rules
in theory,147 the right has rarely been invoked148 and certainly
not in connection with rules the EU regards as sacrosanct and
central to its very purpose.149 Consequently, the veto right may
be of little practical use to the UK.
Thus, in actuality, the difference between the democratic
deficit experienced by an EEA member versus an EU member
states may be more imagined than real, although one could
argue that a direct seat on the various EU councils is
qualitatively preferable, even if not quantitatively measurable.
But even if any potential democratic deficit under the EEA
model would render the UK no worse off, the broad objective of
Brexit is to secure a more favorable position, especially with
respect to EU regulation.150
3. Sovereignty
Under the EEA Agreement, the UK is unlikely to enjoy
significant repatriation of sovereignty. While the UK would
regain control over its agricultural and fisheries policies, among
others, the requirement for EEA members to adopt significant
portions of the acquis would prevent the UK from significantly
altering its domestic policies with respect to immigration, a
central demand in its recent renegotiation efforts with the EU.151
Likewise, burdensome EU legislation and red tape would
continue to affect the UK as an EEA member, which requires
flanking policies in addition to adoption of fundamental policies
such as the four freedoms.152 The likelihood is that this would
mean cumbersome EU rules that UK businesses have identified
as particularly burdensome, such as the Working Time
Directive, would remain in effect.153
147. See BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56, at 234.
148. See LINDSELL, supra note 81, at 53–54 (noting that in all but a few
cases, use of the reservation or veto by EEA/EFTA members has been averted).
149. The only time Norway appears to have flirted with exercising its veto
right was in connection with an EU postal directive. See LINDSELL, supra note
81, at 58–60. Contrast this with the EU’s reaction to Switzerland’s attempt to
renege on its commitment to the free movement of persons. See, e.g., Forster &
Scherrer, supra note 118; Henley, supra note 118.
150. See Cameron, supra note 30.
151. See Cameron Letter, supra note 31.
152. CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., supra note 56, at 6.
153. MILLER ET AL., supra note 1, at 39. The Working Time Directive is an
EU policy that places restrictions on the maximum number of working hours
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One area in which the EEA model permits greater exercise
of sovereignty is on the international stage. Several
commentators note that EEA membership would provide the UK
with greater influence in international bodies.154 While not a
central UK concern in terms of its relationship with the EU, the
ability to voice its own issues and agenda on the international
stage, as distinct from those of the EU, could be a valuable asset
and may help foster expansion of trade and treaty arrangements
with countries outside the EU.
E. EEA SUMMARY
Like the Swiss approach, the EEA model fails to fully
address the UK’s central concerns with the EU and falls some
distance short of the desired outcome. While some see the
Norwegian approach as a viable alternative to EU
membership,155 it offers few substantive advantages and some
significant drawbacks.
One particular drawback is that there is arguably less scope
for reform under the EFTA/EEA Agreements than under the
bilateral approach and, even if there was such a scope, there is
no guarantee that existing members want to move the EEA in
the same direction as the UK.156 For example, a UK attempt to
modify the existing EEA Agreement to include equal voting
rights with full EU members (referred to as an EFTA/EEA-lite
model by some authors)157 is unlikely to prove successful because
the EU’s distaste for cherry picking, expressed in connection
with the bilateral approach, would apply with equal force in the
EEA/EFTA context. Put another way, the EU is unlikely to
extend equal privileges without equal obligations. Furthermore,
changes to the EEA model as it currently exists would require
alteration to the governing treaties, which can only be
within a week, minimum daily rest periods and annual paid leave. See
Maximum Weekly Working Hours, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/maximumweekly-working-hours/overview (last visited Aug. 29, 2016) (explaining the
basics of the Working Time Directive); Working Conditions: Working Time
Directive, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=706
&intPageId=205&langId=en (last visited Aug. 29, 2016).
154. See, e.g., BUS. FOR BRITAIN, supra note 56, at 234; LINDSELL, supra note
81, at 27–30.
155. See, e.g., FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 51.
156. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 56–57 (noting the potential tensions
that could develop between EFTA members were the UK to join).
157. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 43, at 63–68.
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accomplished with unanimous approval of EEA members and
EU member states.158 Perhaps because of these and other
imperfections, one author characterizes the EEA model as a
“halfway house.”159 However, the orientation of EEA/EFTA
members appears to be halfway towards the EU, rather than
away from it. Such an orientation is unlikely to correspond with
the UK’s long-term objectives if it elects to leave the EU.160
III.

CONCLUSION

The choice UK voters faced to leave the EU was one of
enormous significance with the potential for wide-ranging
consequences that will be felt by generations to come. Even as
narrowly conceived, Brexit is likely to impact such diverse areas
as business, trade, agriculture, the justice system, and the rights
of British citizens living at home and abroad, to name a few.
Broader implications include the UK’s place in the world, the
impact upon the EU, and even the continued existence of the
United Kingdom. Few times in the UK’s history has a
government granted its citizens the opportunity to shape its
future destiny in such dramatic fashion.
This Note has considered two alternative options the UK
might consider in place of full EU membership. This Note
concludes that the Swiss bilateral approach is largely an
anomaly and faces a considerable uphill battle to continue to
function in its current form. The Swiss approach is cumbersome
and disjointed and does not sit well with the EU preference for
closer unity and cooperation across a range of policy areas. The
Norwegian approach offers some advantages over the bilateral
model and provides a much greater degree of stability. However,
in reality, the Norwegian model more closely resembles full EU
membership and retains many of the shortcomings the UK
either wishes to escape or reform. In summary, the gains to be
realized from either approach are marginal and cannot justify
the significant upheaval and uncertainty withdrawal from the
EU is likely to cause. While in the near term at least, the better
outcome of the referendum may have been for Britain to remain
within the EU and to concentrate its efforts on producing
158. Id. at 67.
159. FLEXIT, supra note 47, at 55.
160. But see id. (stating that, “if EEA membership can be a halfway house
for countries wishing to join the EU, it could serve equally well in reverse.”).
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meaningful reform, that proverbial ship has sailed. Instead,
Britain must now carefully consider how it will shape its future
relations with its most immediate neighbors. Whether the UK
can secure for itself a more advantageous arrangement with the
EU and a brighter future remains to be seen.

